

FACING THE OTHER:
AN ATTEMPT AT ESCHATOLOGICAL
INTERPRETATION OF D. H.
LAWRENCE'S WORK

Having described himself as primarily “a passionately religious man”¹ (Lawrence 1955: 17), Lawrence understands his work to be a deep religious response to the living cosmos and an intense ontological yearning to be (Elijade 2003: 70). Being man, he is profoundly convinced, means being a thought-adventurer. While, rather than being a mere combination of the acquired information, “the juggling and twisting of already existent ideas” (Lawrence 1998: 226), within the impassive Cartesian *cogito*, real knowledge (by a “super-scientific grace” (Lawrence 1996: 216)) sprouts from the immediate sensual recognition of an unknown world. In one’s genuine attendance to the Other, “in his wholeness wholly attending” (Lawrence 1998: 226), one adventures into the unknown, risking all the inherited conceptions (including the “old stable” ego), and becomes transported to another ontological level, where he transcends the misery of time and acquires freedom to create. In other words, he restores the crucifixion within himself and, finally, gains grounds to fulfil his existence as man, to become a “natural aristocrat,”² a doorway to the transcendent truth.

As Sybilla from Cuma begs freedom from the prison of her old body, so does Lawrence become embittered with the culture in which “[t]here is no outside. There is only more knowledge to be added” (Lawrence 1961: 617) which makes us “people of *postponed* destiny” (Lawrence 1980: 32). Lawrence argues that instead of living as a whole man alive, as an organic unit of the whole reality, which is man’s greatest responsibility³ (“I am part of the sun as my eye is part of me,” he says (Lawrence 1980: 126)), democratic man lives by “the cohesive force of ‘love’ and the resistant force of the individual ‘freedom’” (Lawrence 1980: 123) which is understood through individual isolation. Resisting unnaturally our relation with the other means creating our individuality from ourselves, which repeatedly recalls the original sin into the world.

In terms of eschatological metaphysics, only in our response to the other, when love overcomes isolation, by communication of “I” and “thou”, lies man’s true nature, our freedom and sacredness. In our world “the sun is outside of me,” says Nikolai Berdjajev, and that “indicates my fallen condition,” while free of reification it must be “within me and radiate from me” (Berdjajev 2000: 59). But not in the sense of naïve realism, which in his perspective turns into unintelligent

subjectivism for it implies that the unknown world does not exist, a notion that renders philosophy devoid of *raison d'être*. When the naïve man of today states that he recognizes as real only what he perceives, he actually admits, believes Berdjaev, that the reality of the world depends only on the perceiver. In a similar manner, Lawrence finds that the science of his time turns the unique world of phenomena, the “confusion of vitalities,” into a mass of objects, seeing the reality in what is but a cultural play, mostly a linguistic activity. For example, in the episode from *Women in Love* in which Gudrun and Ursula walk through the woods and notice a robin, they immediately apply human attributes to it. Gudrun assumes that the robin feels important, while Ursula names it “a little Lloyd George of the air” (Lawrence 1996b: 229-30). The object being merely what the thought speculates about, becomes thus the least real, the least existential of all things. Pointing to the absurdity of such an attempt at identification of reality with what we are or what we possess, Lawrence attempts to put himself in the mind of a kind brown hen:

But that is what I want: that she shall nod to me, with a ‘*Howdy!*’ – and I shall nod to her, more politely: ‘*How-do-you-do, Flat-foot?*’ [...] She might as well address me: ‘*Oh my skin-flappy split pole!*’ Which would be like her impudence. Skin-flappy, of course, would refer to my [...] baggy cord trousers. How would *she* know I don’t grow them like a loose skin! (1961: 433)

This projection of the limitedness of the transcendental subject into the outer world Lawrence calls “all that Lady of Shalott business” (Lawrence 1996b: 33) anthropomorphism and *connaissance*, and Berdjaev calls reification through cognition or fall into objectification (2000: 50-63). Elsewhere Lawrence impatiently asks: “Do you imagine the great realities [...] are only *symbols* of something human?” (1961: 479) On the contrary, the outer world is indifferent to the contents of mind; if we attempt at truly attending, it will always reply, to use Forster’s metaphor from the Marabar caves, in the same incomprehensible tongue – “‘bou-oum,’ or ‘ou-boum.’” However, it has long been argued in philosophy that consciousness and the world of phenomena are made possible exactly by the unknowable background of things. The life, which exists out of mind, does appear in the mind only with active participation of the speculative subject. But the subjective mind is not absolute; “the mind has no existence by itself,” Lawrence says, “it is only the glitter of the sun on the surface of the waters” (1961a: 126). It behaves as a traveller who looks at the country, which he passes by. Nevertheless, the traveller must know that “[i]t is not the country which passes by and fades, it is not the sun which sinks to oblivion. Neither is it the flower that withers, not the song that dies out.” (Lawrence 1961a: 375)

Berdjaev suggests that man’s unrestful quest for knowledge and affirmation of his situation should imply recognition of the usage of an inadequate terminology. Namely, we are accustomed to speak about an object of our thoughts, whereas he proposes thinking about a subject, i.e. a living presence that responds to us. In other words, he suggests knowing out of reification. Because the truth is not knowledge of an object but victory over reification, which assumes a meeting

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between two subjects in the mystical experience in which all is in me and I am in all, the moral postulate of the existentialist philosophy should be to liberate man's personality and his relation with the Other of that mistaken definition of man as an object. Further on, as man creates objects and God creates subjects, Berdjaev argues, man should not be approached as an object but as a collocutor, just as God is not an object but a collocutor. There is always something in the subject which eludes our conscious knowledge ("[t]his is because the *sun* is always *sun beyond sun beyond sun*" (1961a: 375), Lawrence may say), something transcendent, unknown, and perhaps incomprehensible. If alterity were not immanent to its constitution, as Levinas argues (1999: 28), all the phenomena would be but an intentional structure of mind. In Lawrence's poetical language this thought assumes the following expression:

Unless the sun were enveloped in the body of darkness, would a cast shadow run with me as I walk? Unless the night lay within the embrace of light, would the fish gleam phosphorescent in the sea, would the light break out of the black coals of the hearth, would the electricity gleam out of itself, suddenly declaring an opposite being? (Lawrence 1961a: 370)

Therefore, to gain real knowledge, our thought must always be turned to this wonder, this advent of unknown life; it must immerse into the dark unknown and probably incomprehensible sphere, when we are obliged to act morally, i.e. to be true to the authenticity we perceive, wondering to evoke its mystery. *Ego cogito, ergo sum* must be read in a different way – in my openness towards this "strange presence" (Lawrence 1961a: 618) which is "without me [...] beyond me, not me," (Lawrence 1961b: 38) who is manifestation of the Other, or the Other Himself. This openness is what Lawrence calls thought adventure and it enables realization of being.

In so far as I am I, a being who is proud and in place, I have a connection with my circumambient universe, and I know my place. When the white cock crows, I do not hear myself, or some anthropomorphic conceit, I hear the not-me, the voice of the Holy Ghost. (Lawrence 1961b: 481)

Facing the other, man becomes constituted as *persona*. In eschatological ontology, as Richard Kearney explains in his book *The God Who May Be: A Hermeneutics of Religion*, *persona* is not understood as a natural category but as a creative act; hence it is not self-sufficient, egocentric, but it passes into the other, into "thou". *Persona* is also a synonym for the otherness of the other, that which "resides beyond my intentional horizon" (Kearney 2005). Richard Kearney makes an assumption that as an inimitable singularity, *persona* becomes an eschatological aura of "possibility" (2005), and as such it belongs to me. Moreover, I have priority over it because it confirms me in the immediate presence, in reality. In Chapter "Continental" in *Women in Love*, for example, leaving the known world of England with its lights fading away, Ursula also abandons the social mask defined in that surrounding, and, expecting a new life, feels like being born again:

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Ursula went on in an unreal suspense [...] She was not herself, – she was not anything. She was something that is going to be – soon – soon – very soon. But as yet, she was only imminent. (Lawrence 1996b: 337)

In this image of Ursula feeling “her soul stirring to awake from its anaesthetic sleep” (1996b: 337), Lawrence also hints at his already well developed conception of nothingness as the main condition of birth. We find it also in his metaphor of flowering, in which the centre of the flower is nothingness which will forever stay unknown to us, but which is exactly the possibility of blossom and the petals that surround it (Crummet 1999: 19-20). This nothingness, therefore, is not a sphere of absence, but the sphere of the yet unknown and the conventionally unnameable. Eschatological metaphysics understands “nothing” as the “Divine Nothing,”²⁴ not as emptiness but as a primary and absolutely perfect principle prior to God and the world, like a seed which keeps in itself a possibility of the Holy Ghost, like Paul in the end of the novel, “himself [...] at the core a nothingness, and yet not nothing” (Lawrence 1976: 510). In *The Rainbow*, also, one is said to be “merely an unfixd something-nothing, blowing about like the winds of heaven, undefined, unstated” (Lawrence 1996c: 267). Furthermore, Richard Kearney observes *persona* as a dwelling place of God, which exists as a possibility of being (rather than actuality, *fait accompli*), and, therefore as the promised kingdom. However, the promise remains powerless until and unless *we respond* to it.

Responding to the Other, man exists in an *ec-static* way. As Laušević explains, it is not possible to say I am unless I am brought into relation, but then I expose to vulnerability this first “I am” (2002: 145) or, in Lawrence’s words, my old stable ego. This process also understands the risk Lawrence talks about. “We have to meet,” he says, “as I meet a jaguar between the trees in the mountains, and advance, and touch, and risk it. [...] Take the risk, make the adventure. [...] But with man, it is a thought-adventure. He risks his body and blood.” (Lawrence 1961a: 620). Elsewhere, he says:

Life is travelling to the edge of knowledge, then a leap taken. We cannot know beforehand. We are driven from behind, always as over the edge of the precipice. It is the leap taken into the beyond, as a lark leaps into the sky, a fragment of earth which travels to be fused out, sublimated, in the shining of the heavens. (Lawrence 1961a: 374)

Elaborating on the idea of man’s responsibility, Šijaković goes on to say that my response to the Other, actually creates the very relation which makes *me* possible – and that is love. Because, responding to the Other, I do it in front of the Third, who is the original Other, i.e. the First (Šijaković 2002: 71). The inducible nature of the Other, who determines me, does not mean that the Other is perfect, absolute, complete, out of his relation with me, because he does not force this responsibility on me, neither does he subordinate me to him, in his will, but I am free to chose this responsibility (Šijaković 2002: 71). “[I]n a new adventure,” Lawrence says, man “dares take thought [...] for what he has done and what has happened to him. And daring to take thought, he ventures on, and realizes at

last.” (1961a: 620). This is the kind of responsibility, I suppose, Rupert Birkin from *Women in Love* seeks when he asks for a relationship that would transcend the phantom forms of social situation⁵ and build on, what he calls, the impersonal roots of being: from “a beyond, in you, in me, which is further than love, beyond the scope, as stars are beyond the scope of vision, some of them” (Lawrence 1996b: 124). He hopes they might find “love that is like sleep, like being born again, [...] like death [...] so we are found different.” (Lawrence 1996b: 160).

In *Otherwise of Being* Levinas argues that to be open to the alterity of being does not mean a possibility of knowing it, because in that way we would think the transcendent as an object and again attempt at appropriating it (1999: 268-273). The same awareness forms the starting point of Lawrence’s poetics. He repeats time and again that the mysterious reality of the real lies in the mystical fourth dimension, which cannot be measured; because measuring reduces the wonderful world of differences, “confusion of vitalities,” to a monistic universe and thus denies it. Therefore the paradoxical nature of knowing the Other – in an ontological sense, as nothing, in a hermeneutical sense, as unknowable, and in a linguistic sense, as inexpressible (Šijaković 2002: 41-42). Or, as Lawrence says, “[l]ife travels in flame from the unseen to the unseen, men will never know how and why.” Only the Holy Ghost knows the nature of different manifestations – but “heaven only knows what the Holy Ghost is!” (1984: 188) Hence, for example, as Rosemary Sumner points out, those “innumerable negatives” in Lawrence’s work – “untranslatable”, “unloving”, “inhuman”, to name some from the list she gives (2000: 16).

In his *Essay in Eschatological Ontology*, Berdjaev confirms this notion saying that knowing the truth means to be aware of the meaning that is forever born and reborn in being. Working along the same line, contemporary Greek philosopher John Zizioulas understands that the given, that which is already there, actually belongs to the past, whereas, for eschatological ontology, the truth of being lies in the future. As the relation with the other is the relation with the future, which is out of the grasp of humanity and can never be had, it is also a “call to the salvation of our rationality from this bondage to the past” (Zizioulas 2005). Daniel J. Schneider, who finds in Lawrence’s art another alternative to logocentrism, observes that Lawrence was aware of this “belatedness of thought.” He quotes Birkin’s argument: “You can only have knowledge [...] of things concluded, in the past. It’s like bottling the liberty of last summer.” (Schneider 1992: 163). In his essay “Why the Novel Matters”, in the image of the hand which moves, touches, and learns things, Lawrence’s theory of knowledge, as Elizabeth Wallace has also observed, (1990: 105-106) develops into an assertion that being fully here and now, which is “a struggle into conscious being,” forces us towards the unknown and towards the future. “This *knowing* [...] is a force active in the immediate rear of life,” says Lawrence, “and the greater its activity, the greater the forward, unknown movement ahead of it” (1984: 41). The intersection of these two movements, as elaborated in “The Crown”, when noumenal breaks into phenomenal (as is embodied, for example, in the symbol of twilight), when God becomes revealed to a being, is timeless. At the same time, it is both the beginning and the end. In other words, it is when the consummation of being happens and man enters existential time, as different from the cosmic or historical times, which Berdjaev calls fallen

times.⁶ Illustrative of this is the conversation between Connie and Clifford in *Lady Chatterley's Lover*. While Clifford listens with distrust to Connie's unconcern for "Plato's ideas, and heaven, and those things" (Lawrence 1978: 64), Connie only hopes that she will have enough strength to put her life in the hands of God: "Immortality can't be anything we *know*. It *can* only be something we feel," she says. "If I don't feel I'm immortal now, what's the good of fussing about it later on?" (Lawrence 1978: 64-5). Quite paradoxically, as Laušević argues, to be in time and of time already means to be out of mere existence, because time makes us capable of relation; it is exactly in time that encounters happen (1999: 39-40).

Lawrence strongly believed that human body provides a clear example of the mutual interdependence of phenomena and noumena, materiality and meaning. In his seminal book *Phenomenology of Perception*, M. Merleau-Ponty says that human body is the way for authentic thought and authentic speech, becoming thus a real symbol of man. Moreover, in the moment of sensual recognition (of this "beyondness") we feel life most directly, because, Berdjaev explains, this recognition is unavoidably followed by passion – and it is exactly this passion that makes an active breakthrough towards meaning and annuls time for an adventuring man, who in turn feels only his naked being. "Man is himself the vivid body of life," Lawrence says in *Study of Thomas Hardy*. "Altogether devoid of knowledge and conscious motive is he when he is heaving into uncreated space, when he is actually living, becoming himself." (Lawrence 1984: 42). Therefore, realization takes place and remains out of time.

The perfect relation is perfect. But it is therefore timeless. And we must not think to tie a knot in Time, and thus make the consummation temporal or eternal. The consummation is timeless, and we belong to Time, in our process of living. (Lawrence 1961a: 412)

Life, which is man's leap into the unknown, is born into the curving shape of the body, which connects the spaces of Heavens with the spaces of earth. This curving shape is also present in the rainbow, which is Biblical sign of pledge between God and men, as it "gathered, mysteriously, from nowhere" (Lawrence 1996c: 467) in freedom and love. Being the arch of spectral colours, which brings together the rays of the sun and the raindrops, which is water the sky returns to the earth, the rainbow connects the infinities of earth and heaven. In its bent shape Ursula sees "the earth's new architecture [...] the world built up in a living fabric of Truth, fitting to the over-arching heaven" (Lawrence 1996c: 467). In a similar manner, in Lawrence's novel *Kangaroo*, Richard Somers observes: "The rainbow was always a symbol to him [...] A pledge of unbroken faith, between the universe and the innermost." (Lawrence 1960: 173).

This rainbow reminds of Heidegger's conception of the bridge, which does not connect the already existing riversides, but they become such only when the bridge rises in an arch above the river. Still, the riversides thus brought into relation are not indifferent borders of land, but they open further away to the spaces and hills spreading behind. Moreover, the bridge, as an arching gate over the river, also connects the sky, rain and snow that make the water rise, and so it also gathers the

opposites. However differences of these phenomena are not obliterated within this ring-like relating, but recognized as such (Hajdeger 1982: 91-93). Further on, in *Book of Revelation* (10:1), an angel, “clothed with a cloud [with] a rainbow was on his head,” approaches John and raises his right hand towards the heaven swearing “by Him who lives forever and ever [...] that there should be delay no longer” (10:6), i.e. that the miserable time of disintegration and suppression, the time of the past and the fear of future will stop. In this way, human history becomes a drama of realization of man’s freedom and salvation. Besides, the eschatological world is not to be obtained in a linear process of appropriation – it is rather a parallel world, residing in us and always about to happen. When we go to Heaven or go to Hell, we don’t go anywhere, because there is “nowhere to go,” Lawrence says (1980: 48-50). Or, as Margaret Atwood writes in *Alias Grace*, “when you go mad you don’t go any other place, you stay where you are. And *somebody* else comes in.” (Atwood 1997: 37, italics – M.K.).

In Lawrence’s symbolism of the transcendent, the Morning/Evening Star has a prominent place. It transcends man and transcends knowledge, keeping in itself the realities of water, earth, and sky. Ramon, as a natural aristocrat, is a saviour who keeps in himself this star but can never determine it in words, as it is always “beyond the white of whiteness,/ Beyond the blackness of black,/ beyond the spoken day,/ Beyond the unspoken passion of night” (Lawrence 1996a: 346). It is the mysterious link between man’s blood and the universe, the authentic, indubitable part, which gives woman her womanhood and to man his manhood. But it exists outside of human will: “You don’t have it of your own will,” says Ramon. “It comes from – from the middle – from the God. Beyond me, at the middle, is the God.” (Lawrence 1996a: 63). Responding to this new categorical imperative,⁷ Ramon expands the space for life, enables new relations between man and universe, and, thus, becomes the bridge, an abode of the Holy Ghost. When he allows his beloved into his heart, he becomes able to transcend his historical place, his temporal and spatial situation, and experience himself as personified life energy. He transfers his esoteric knowledge to his followers which enables them themselves to realize as an abode for one another. [A]t twilight,” teaches Ramon, “between the night and the day; man and woman, in presence of the unfading star, meet to be perfect in one another. Lift your face, Caterina, and say: *This man is my rain from heaven. This woman is the earth to me* – say that, Cipriano. (Lawrence 1996a: 295). This encounter allows admission to eternity through the other. “If they have met as earth and rain,” says Ramon, “so that a meeting has come to pass [...] then shall neither of them betray the abiding place where the meeting lives like an unsettling star.” (Lawrence 1996a: 295).

For Lawrence, the symbols of genitals and sexual intercourse have cosmic connotation and hierophantic significance. Thus the little stone houses by female Etruscan tombs are interpreted as birthplaces of life,⁸ while the carving of phallus on the male tombs becomes a symbol of creative recreation of life, as “[w]ith the mystery of phallus goes all the beauty of the world, and beauty is more than knowledge” (Lawrence 1978: 156). This also enables Lawrence to easily connect phallus with the cross, which, as Mircea Eliade teaches us, represents the Cosmic Tree – placed in the centre of the universe like an axis, so that the symbol of

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 crucifixion represents man's threefold existence: in matter, in spirit, and through the unity of life and death (2003: 87-90).

The Cross, as an ancient symbol, has an inevitable phallic reference. But it is far deeper than sex. It is the self which darkly inhabits our blood and bone, and for which the ithyphallus is but a symbol [...] And on this cross of division in the whole self is crucified the Christ. We are all crucified on it. (Lawrence 1961a: 619)

The openness of the body on the cross, as it also symbolizes assumption, represents that what being is all about, the door to the other worlds. With his arms widely spread,⁹ man starts feeling his cosmic foundation and the presence of things that are other, radically different, not himself. Thus, he acquires a “feeling awareness” of the immediate presence, breaks off with profane existence, and becomes creator.

In his religious and mystic response to the life perceived, to “the felt but unknown flame,” feeling that the inherited language makes his work already past before it actually happens,¹⁰ Lawrence finds another foundation to his work. To be “a bright book of life” means to be true to the wonderful presences that transcend it, to tremble “in-between” the imminent and the transcendent truth, as an attempt at communicating the incommunicable. This also assumes becoming free of the necessity, existing in the way of the Etruscan chimera that presents a lion but which “at the same moment” could be “also a goat and not a goat” (Lawrence 1994: 68). When this disobedience materialized into Lawrence's narrative world, it provoked protest among various Lawrence's critiques who insisted that his novels lacked form. The noncompliant narrative of *Kangaroo's*, for example, forced, among other things, a conclusion that it is not a novel at all, but rather a failure of art.¹¹ The same attempt at avoiding conventionality and ready-made forms in art is obvious in Lawrence's books of travel, where the narrator is forced to relate his impressions being all the time aware that his words are false, while his choice of narrative clearly witnesses this awareness, as in its descriptive passages it insists on the vacillating modifiers.¹² In his essay “Paradox of the Mystical Knowledge of God”, Bogoljub Šijaković elaborates that, as “the mystical experience of unity with God is a communication with transcendence,” it is reportable only “in a *completely other language*, in the language that ceases to be language” (2002: 59). A mystic wants

to think speech and silence in their identity and not in difference. The very word ‘mystique’ (μυστική) [...] is derived from the verb ‘myo’ (μύω) – to speak ‘my’ (μῦ), namely to utter everything that can be told when we hut our mouth: in this ‘M’ speech and silence are together. Paradoxical, isn't it? (Šijaković 2002: 60-61)

Lawrence's mystic experience forces him, an artist in words, to fight back language to its very limits and make it transcend itself. Ignoring stylistic rules, following logical and poetic vortex of the old living symbols, recreating the narrative of rituals, for example in repetitions, relying on paradoxes and remaining

faithful to a perceived “instability of balance,” Lawrence makes his work, a frontier zone of narrative. As his complex narrative structure pushes towards the inexpressible, like in Will’s enamoured experience of the Cathedral in *The Rainbow*, or in Lawrence’s famous oxymoron, “blood-consciousness,” that carries across the heterogeneous semantic fields, it opens spaces of freedom and transcendence.

Supplementing and reanimating rather than substituting for life, as Jack Stewart observes, in an exchange of energy, synergy, as a “restructuring of perceptions that stimulates the endless play of creative consciousness with forms” (2002: 134) as “a tremulation” that can make “the whole man alive tremble,” (Lawrence 1984: 195)¹³ Lawrence’s work embodies an act of becoming, it is the truest embodiment of the “thought-adventure” – the bridge, an abode of God – so that it is also possible to speak about his narrative eschatology or eschatological narrative.

1 “To Edward Garnett, 22 April, 1914”.

2 Cf. D. H. Lawrence, “Aristocracy”.

3 Cf. *Ibid*, p. 125.

4 In the negative theology of Dionysius the Areopagite “Divine Nothing” is the realm out of which God created the world.

5 With all its complexity that encompasses, as R. D. Laing summarizes, “[h]is identity-for-himself, identity others ascribe to him, the identities he ascribes to them, the identity or identities he thinks they attribute to him, what he thinks they think he thinks they think ...” R. D. Laing, *Self and Others*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971, p. 50.

6 In his essay “History and Eschatology”, Berdjaev defines three types of time: cosmic, historical, and existential. While cosmic and historical times refer to precise past points in time and, therefore, are qualified with inertia, “existential time” happens in present and is supertemporal. Similar notion may be found in *Mornings in Mexico*.

7 “We *must* change back to the vision of the living cosmos; we *must*. [...] That is how man is made. I accept the *must* from the oldest Pan in my soul, and from the newest *me*. Once a man gathers his whole soul together and arrives at a conclusion, the time of alternatives has gone. I *must*. No more than that. I *am* the First Man of Quetzalcoatl. I am Quetzalcoatl himself.” *Ibid*, p. 283.

8 “And that is what it is, the Ark, the *arx*, the womb. The womb of all the world, that brought forth all the creatures. The womb, the *arx*, where life retreats in the last refuge.[...] in which lies the mystery of eternal life, the manna and the mysteries.” D. H. Lawrence, *Sketches of Etruscan Places*, in *Sketches of Etruscan Places and Other Italian Essays*, p. 110.

9 This motion is also present in the image of Ramon performing ritual in his room in *The Plumed Serpent*.

10 Cf. Jean-François Lyotard, “Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?”, in Peter Brooker (ed), *Modernism / Postmodernism*, London and New York: Longman, 1999, pp. 139-150.

11 Cf. “*Kangaroo* is hardly a novel. It is at best an effort, a futile effort, to solve a problem.” Eliseo Vivas, *The Failure and the Triumph of Art*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1960, p. 16.

12 Cf. Marija Knežević, *Lorens u Italiji*, Beograd: Zadužbina Andrejević, 2002, str. 15-24; and Marija Knežević, “Translating Lawrence into Serbian. *Twilight in Italy*”, *Englises: Literature Inglesi Contemporane*, No 18, Anno 6, Rome, 2002.

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SUMMARY

FACING THE OTHER: AN ATTEMPT AT ESCHATOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF D. H. LAWRENCE'S WORK

Having described himself as primarily "a passionately religious man," Lawrence understands his work to be a deep religious response to the living cosmos and an intense ontological yearning to be. Being man, he is profoundly convinced, means being a thought-adventurer. While, rather than being a mere combination of the acquired information within the impassive Cartesian *cogito*, real knowledge sprouts from the immediate sensual recognition of an unknown world. In one's genuine attendance to the Other, one ventures into the unknown, risking all the inherited conceptions and becomes transported to another ontological level, where the misery of time is transcended and freedom to create is acquired. In an attempt to give my interpretation of Lawrence's text an eschatological frame, I draw on the rich field of research carried out in eschatological metaphysics, while primarily relying on the work of Nikolaj Berdjajev.

KEYWORDS: the Other, eschatological, religious, mystic, ontological, being, Cartesian, transcendental subject, reification, thought-adventure.